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Abstract: as the healthcare sector grows in significance due to social and 
technical developments the EU competition rules are likely to be more 
frequently applied to healthcare both as a result of the broad interpretation of 
the concept of undertaking and because the applicable antitrust rules are 
since modernisation also applied at Member State level. At the same time 
there is so far little guidance regarding the manner in which the substantive 
rules must be applied. This problem is less serious concerning state aid 
where the beginnings of a framework exist, in particular in the form of the 
Altmark test and the services of general economic interest (SG EI) concept, 
and where enforcement remains largely centralised in the hands of the 
Commission. W e plead for a broader application of SG EI and of the 
legitimate objective test that is found in Wouters and Meca-Medina. In 
particular we advocate providing guidance by means of a soft law approach 
within the European competition network (ECN).
JEL Codes: I; I1; K; K 21; L4.
Key words: EU competition law, healthcare; healthcare and: EU law, case 
law, Court of Justice, General Court, antitrust, merger control, state aid, 
services of general economic interest, SGEI, internal market
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1. Introduction
What are we to expect from the EU competition rules in relation to the 
healthcare sector - either at national or at EU level? Do these rules apply, 
and if so, how? 
The past twelve years have seen a rapid emergence of EU free movement 
law in relation to healthcare. The case law of the European Court of Justice 
on services, from the emblematic Kohll and Decker Cases to Watts and Van
A
Delft has been at the forefront of this development,1 which now appears to be
•j
culminating in EU harmonisation legislation with regard to patients’ rights.2 
More recently freedom of establishment Cases are setting new boundaries.3 
All these developments are contentious because although the manner in 
which healthcare is organised differs widely between the Member States 
(while they can broadly be divided into insurance based Bismarck systems 
and National Health Service based Beveridge systems) in all cases public 
authorities are deeply involved in regulating not just entitlements but also the 
market structure at all levels.4 Similar problems (such as spiralling costs) due 
to increased aging, rising expectations and technical developments are also 
shared albeit from different starting points. The resultant evolution of EU law 
is fairly well charted. 
The EU competition law dimension of healthcare is so far less frequently 
discussed. This is noteworthy also because following the modernisation of
1 Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931 and
Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR I- 
1831 ; Case C-372/04 The Queen, ex parte Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust 
and Secretary of State for Health (Watts) [2006] ECR I-4325 and case C-345/09, Van 
Delft et al., judgment of 14 October 2010 (nyr). Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, “Cross-Border 
Healthcare in the EU and the Organization of the National Healthcare Systems of the 
Member States. The Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of Justice's 
Decisions on Free Movement and Competition Law” (2009) Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 705; A. Dawes, “Bonjour Herr Doktor: national healthcare systems, the 
internal market and cross-border medical care within the EU”, (2006) Legal Issues of 
European Integration 27; V.G. Hatzopoulos, “Killing national health and insurance 
systems but healing patients? The European market for healthcare services after the 
judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms”, (2002) Common Market Law 
Review 683.2
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of 
patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, C0M(2008) 414 final. At the time of writing 
this piece of proposed legislation is subject to conciliation proceedings between the 
European Parliament and the Council.
3 See L. Hancher and W. Sauter, “One step beyond? From Sodemare to DocMorris: The
EU’s freedom of establishment case law concerning healthcare” (2010) Common 
Market Law Review 117. An important case in this respect is Case C-169/07, Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Wiener Landesregierung and Oberosterreichische 
Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721.
4 Cf. E. Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten and T.K. Hervey, (eds), Health systems
governance in Europe: the role of European Union law and policy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2010); T.K. Hervey and J. McHale, Health law and the 
European Union (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004).
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EU competition law since May 2004 the national competition authorities 
(NCAs) of the Member States have been charged with applying the antitrust
jr
provisions Articles 101 and 102 TFEU where a Union dimension is involved.5 
Moreover in most cases the Member States have adopted highly similar 
systems of national competition law in a process of spontaneous 
harmonisation. Both systems can be relied upon in national courts as the 
relevant provisions of the Treaty have direct effect, and although this is not 
formally a result of modernisation, in a practical terms the number of cases 
based on the EU competition rules before national courts is likely to multiply.6 
Hence, many competition rules of the Member States must be interpreted in 
the light of European competition law.
The application at national level of EU competition law rules and principles to 
healthcare is on the one hand potentially problematic given the political 
sensitivities, while on the other hand it may invigorate the sector and open 
new opportunities for more efficient provision. In all cases it is important that 
the way the rules are applied should be clear. Hence the question arises: 
does EU law (Treaty provisions, guidelines, and especially decisional 
practice and judgments) give adequate guidance on how the NCAs - as well 
as, for that matter, national courts - should apply the competition rules to 
healthcare cases? And what about market parties who have to make a self­
assessment whether the cartel provision or its legal exemption mechanism 
applies? Does EU law take into account the specific features of healthcare 
services? Below we briefly set out our approach to addressing these 
questions.
Addressing the delicate interplay between competition and healthcare 
requires some general background on EU competition law and its make-up. 
The objective of EU competition law is creating a regime of undistorted 
competition on the internal market. This area of EU law predominately 
applies to undertakings, as opposed to the free movement rules which in 
general apply only to public authorities. This is why we will first examine the 
definition of what constitutes an undertaking with specific reference to the 
healthcare sector.
Competition law in the strict sense is composed of three sets of rules: (i) the 
cartel prohibition of article 101 TFEU and (ii) the prohibition on dominance 
abuse of article 102 TFEU with respect to the behaviour of undertakings 
(sometimes jointly called antitrust); and (iii) merger control, based on the
5 Articles 3 and 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 
OJ 2003, L1/1.
6 On this matter see H.H.B. Vedder, “Spontaneous harmonisation of national (competition)
laws in the wake of the modernisation of EC competition law”, (2004) Competition Law 
Review 5.
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merger control regulation 139/2004,7 with regard to market structure. We will 
first deal with each of these three elements in turn, followed by a brief look at 
the interaction between the two levels of government, based on the EU law 
doctrines of effet utile and direct effect.
Competition law in the broader sense includes state aid.8 The state aid rules 
likewise address undertakings, and are concerned with answering the 
question whether they are receiving an unfair advantage as the result of state 
measures. Unlike dealing with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the enforcement 
of the state aid rules remains concentrated in the hands of the European 
Commission, although the state aid rules can also be invoked before national 
judges, for instance in relation to aid that has not been notified and is 
therefore per se illegal. We will examine if the state aid rules are applied to 
healthcare, and how strictly.
Finally the rules on services of general economic interest (SG EI) are relevant 
to healthcare, in particular because they potentially provide what from the 
perspective of healthcare appears to be the most important exception to the 
competition and state aid rules. Below we will deal with these topics in the 
order in which they were presented here drawing our conclusions.
2. The definition of undertaking
Because the EU competition rules apply exclusively to (associations of) 
undertakings, the first question is how to define the concept of undertaking. 
Would this cover a healthcare provider or insurer? The case law of the Court 
on this issue is functional in nature: this means that the formal legal 
definitions used in national law are irrelevant.9 What is decisive in this context
1 nis whether the entity concerned is involved in an economic activity. In this 
context an economic activity is described as “any activity consisting in 
offering goods and services on a given market”, in particular, as was outlined 
by the EC J in Pavlov, if this occurs in return for remuneration and if the 
provider of the services assumes the economic risk involved.11
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ 2004, L24/1
8 Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, “Financing healthcare in EU law: Do the European state aid rules
write out an effective prescription for integrating competition law with healthcare?”, 
(2009) Competition Law Review 5.
9 Case 118/85, Commission v Italy (transparency directive) [1987] ECR 2599 at para 11. On
the methodology of the Court see also W . Sauter and H. Schepel, State and market in 
European Union law, the public and private spheres of the internal market before the 
EU courts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009).
10 Case C-41/90, Klaus Hofner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para
2 1 .
11 Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov et al. v Stichting Pensioenfonds
Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451, para 73 ff. with reference to Case 118/85 
Commission v Italy above note 9, para 7, and Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy 
(customs agents) [1998] ECR I-3851, para 36.
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Healthcare providers
As for healthcare providers the EC J easily assumes that they are engaged in 
economic activities. In Pavlov, for example, the EC J held that that 
independent medical specialists perform services in a market (the market for 
specialised medical services), inter alia because they receive remuneration 
for these services and assume the financial risks that are associated with 
their professional activity. The complexity and technical nature of their 
services and the fact that the practice of their profession is regulated did not 
affect this conclusion. Second, as the medical specialists were engaged in an 
economic activity they were held individually to constitute undertakings in the 
sense of the competition rules.
Providing goods and services in competition - or in a context where
competition is possible (potential competition) - is likewise seen as carrying
10out an economic activity as an undertaking.12 This was, for instance, held by 
the Court in relation to ambulance services in the 2001 Glöckner Case.13 
Because services in the market for emergency transport and (non­
emergency) patient transport are not always provided by medical aid 
organisations or by public authorities these services were held to constitute 
an economic activity. This was not altered by the fact that some providers of 
such services might be less competitive as the result of public service 
obligations than other providers without similar obligations. Hence the party 
offering these services (Glöckner) was an undertaking for the purposes of the 
EU competition rules. Accordingly, in the case IRIS-Z hospitals the 
Commission contended that services provided by the public hospitals 
concerned constituted economic activities as similar services were offered by
1Aprivate healthcare operators.14 Hence, in this decision the argument of 
potential competition was also taken into account.
This actual or potential offering of services in competition test leads to the 
conclusion that most if not all private bodies and entities that are active in the 
provision of healthcare are likely to be found to constitute undertakings, 
irrespective of the fact whether they operate in Bismarck systems (in which 
sickness funds or other types of health insurers are the managing bodies) or 
in Beveridge systems (in which tax funded healthcare benefits are provided 
by the state to its population nominally free of charge).
Providers of health insurance
12 Case C-41/90, Höfner, above note 10, paras 22 and 23.
1"3
Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089.
14 See para. 109 of the Decision of the Commission of 28 October 2009 with regard to state 
aid NN 54/2009 (ex CP 244/2005) -  Belgium -  financing of public hospitals of the IRIS­
network of the Brussels capital region.
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However, the EC J has adopted a different approach towards (public law) 
providers of health insurance, respectively purchasing activities of (public) 
healthcare management bodies. It is apparent from the more recent AOK and 
FENIN judgments that the activities of these bodies should be seen in the 
context of the principle of solidarity.15
Financial solidarity and excluding provision on market terms are the 
requirements for classifying a system as exclusively fulfilling a social 
function.16 In this case the entities involved are not regarded as undertakings 
and are excluded from the scope of competition law (but not from the market 
freedoms and public procurement rules that apply to public bodies). This 
conclusion is reached taking into account the objective and compulsory 
nature of a system, the degree of public involvement, any elements of 
redistribution and the manner in which contributions are calculated and
17entitlements are awarded.
. AOK: in the 2004 AOK case the fixing of maximum contributions by 
the German health insurance funds towards the costs of medicinal
A Q
products was at issue. The Court had been asked whether this was 
illegal under the competition rules. The German system made it 
compulsory for employees to join the public law scheme but on the 
other hand the insurance premiums did not only depend on the 
income of the insured party but also on the rate set by the insurance 
company. There was a degree of rate competition between these 
insurers in order to gain the business of both those with compulsory 
insurance and customers who took out insurance voluntarily, with 
price differentials of up to 30% and up to 5% of customers switching 
insurers each year. The insurance funds also implemented a risk 
equalisation system (similar to the Irish and the Dutch schemes that 
will be dealt with below under state aid) which made insurers with less 
burdensome risk profiles contribute to the financing of the funds that 
took care of insuring the more expensive risks. The Court held that the 
German health insurance funds fulfilled an exclusively social function
15 See also J. Lear, E. Mossialos and B. Karl, “EU competition law and health policy” , in 
Health systems governance in Europe, above note 4, p. 343.
16 More broadly in the notion of solidarity cf. C. Newdick, “Citizenship, Free Movement and
Healthcare: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity”, (2006) 
Common Market Law Review 1645.
17 Joined cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Christian Poucet v Assurances Generales de 
France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon [1993] ECR I-637; 
Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) 
v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295.
18 Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al. v
Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co. et al. [2004] ECR I-2493. Annotated by S. 
Belhaj and J.W. van de Gronden in (2004) European Competition Law Review 682. Cf. 
M. Krajewski and M. Farley, “Non-economic activities in upstream markets and the 
scope of competition law after Fenin”, (2007) European Law Review 111.
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based on the principle of solidarity and in the absence of any profit 
motive. In this context the health insurance funds form a collective that 
is based on solidarity (or “Solidargemeinschaft”) which shares out 
costs and risks equitably.
“The sickness funds are therefore not in competition with one another or with 
private institutions as regards grant of the obligatory statutory benefits in 
respect of treatment or medicinal products which constitutes their main 
function.”
And:
“The latitude available to the sickness funds when setting the contribution 
rate and their freedom to engage in some competition with one another in
1Qorder to attract members does not call this analysis into question.” 19
This freedom and that element of competition were only seen as a way of 
pursuing an efficiency gain “in accordance with economic principles of sound 
management”. Therefore the sickness funds were not considered to be 
undertakings, and as a result not to fall within the scope of the competition 
rules.
In our view, what seems to have mattered the most in the view of the ECJ, 
was that no competition was possible on the benefits to which patients were 
entitled. These benefits were fixed in national law and, as a result, the 
sickness funds did not enjoy any discretion when granting these benefits to 
affiliated persons. Apparently, as long as health insurers have no possibility 
of influencing the level of contributions, in the E C J’s view it is not of any 
interest that they do compete on price. It is clear from the outset that the 
outcome of the AOK test is hard to predict. Strikingly for instance, a year after 
AOK in the state aid field the Commission found Dutch health insurers, which 
have limited influence over the level of benefits and have comparable price 
differentials and switching rates did constitute undertakings.20
. FENIN: this 2006 Case concerned a complaint about abuse of 
dominant position (based on systematic late payments to providers of 
medical goods and equipment by on average 300 days) by the 
management bodies of the Spanish national health system (SNS), 
which collectively accounted for 80% of purchases of medical goods 
and equipment in Spain.2' In this case it was accepted (or in any rate 
not effectively contested) that the provision of healthcare services by
19
19 Ibid., paras 54 and 56.
20
2 0  Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 with regard to state aid N 541/2004 en N
542/2004 -  The Netherlands -  risk equalisation system and retention of reserves.
21 Case C-205/03 P, FENIN, above note 17.
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SNS was purely of a social nature. Thereby the main question posed 
to the Court became whether the purchasing activity of the 
management bodies should be examined as a separate activity with 
regard to which they would have to be considered as undertakings to 
which the competition rules applied. In a summarily motivated reaction 
the Court held:
“(...) there is no need to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the 
subsequent use to which they are put in order to determine the nature of that 
purchasing activity, and that the nature of the purchasing activity must be
determined according to whether or not the subsequent use of the purchased
00goods amounts to an economic activity.”22
Consequently there was no economic activity nor an undertaking involved, 
and therefore there could be no question of applying EU competition law.
This case resolved a contentious issue and it should be noted that similar 
cases under national competition law initially went in the opposite direction.23 
Because the (uncontested) solidarity argument was not developed it seems 
there is room for further clarification. Nevertheless the FENIN logic, such as it 
is, clearly it has important implications for NHS systems elsewhere in the EU 
as well, which will similarly combine public provision of care with purchasing 
private goods and services in the market. On the one hand the scope of EU 
competition law in healthcare is thus limited. On the other hand it may be 
assumed that the rules on public procurement and state aid would discipline 
the exercise of public purchasing power for the greater part. This evidently 
makes it important that the interface between the competition rules, the state 
aid and the procurement rules is well-managed. As the public procurement 
rules oblige public bodies to contract the most competitive service providers 
(or suppliers of goods), these rules are capable of restoring the imbalance 
between public health bodies and their contractors. Hence, (as is the case for 
competition law) it is of great importance that public procurement law pay due 
interest to the specific features of healthcare markets. However, because 
public procurement law falls outside the scope of this contribution, we will not 
address this in further detail.24
22 Ibid., para 26.23
E.g. the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal's (CCAT) ruling in the BetterCare case 
found that purchasing by a public body, in certain circumstances, is an economic activity 
carried out by an undertaking and therefore may be subject to the provisions of the UK 
Competition Act 1998. [2002] CAT 7. The German authorities likewise held a 
contrasting view. Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, “Purchasing care: economic activity or 
service of general (economic) interest?”, (2004) European Competition Law Review 84.
24 See e.g. V. Hassopoulos, “Public procurement and state aid in national health systems”, in
Health systems governance in EUorpe, above note 4, p. 379.
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In sum, in order to determine whether the competition rules are applicable to 
healthcare operators one should make a sharp distinction between providers 
and insurers. The first category is supposed to offer services or goods on the 
market and is therefore caught by EU competition law. The second category, 
however, is only caught in so far as they do not operate in accordance with 
principles that are predominantly based on solidarity. In case of a mix of 
solidarity and competition elements health insurers qualify as undertakings 
within the meaning of EU competition law.25 Bodies managing a scheme that 
are based on a mix of solidarity and competition are obliged to observer the 
EU rules on competition. However, an exception may be invoked; especially 
the one contained in Article 106(2) TFEU (SGEI), in order to moderate the 
burdensome effects of the applicability of competition law. In section 5 the 
role of this Treaty provision will be further discussed.
In sum, the EC J has developed an expansive concept of undertaking for 
healthcare providers and a moderated concept for health insurers/managing 
bodies. By not shying away from stretching up the meaning of “undertaking” 
the Union Courts have potentially opened the door to a multitude of 
healthcare cases arising under EU competition law. Those cases will not only 
occur at the EU level but also at the national level, as the enforcement of EU 
competition law is decentralised and national competition law systems are 
modelled on the Treaty. In other words, the Union courts have encouraged 
national authorities to apply the competition rules to a wide range of 
healthcare cases. Yet is guidance from EU law available regarding the 
impact of the competition rules on healthcare? This question will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections.
3. The substantive rules: cartel prohibition, dominance abuse and 
merger control
The present section discusses the potential implications in terms of the 
substantive or material norms of EU competition law in relation to 
healthcare.26 This discussion concerns the rules directed at undertakings:
See e.g. case C-244/94, Federation Française des Sociétés d'Assurance et al. v Ministere 
de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche (FFSA) [1995] ECR I-4015; Case C-67/96, Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751, 
Joined cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v 
Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen [1999] ECR I-6025 
and case C-219/97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven [1999] ECR I-6121.
26 Cf. J. Lear, E. Mossialos and B. Karl, “EU competition policy and health policy”, in Health 
systems governance in Europe, above note 4; J.W. van de Gronden, “The Treaty 
provisions on competition and healthcare”, in J.W. van de Gronden, M. Krajewski, U. 
Neergaard and E. Szyszczak (eds), EU Law and Healthcare (Asser Press, The Hague 
2010); For a general discussion of competition law see J. Faull and A. Nikpay (eds), 
The EC Law of Competition, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), on the 
economics see M. Motta, EU competition policy: theory and practice (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2004).
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Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU and the provisions of the Merger Control 
Regulation. After that, the relationship between EU and national competition 
law will be touched upon.
3.1. The cartel prohibition
The cartel prohibition applies to agreements between and concerted 
practices of undertakings, as well as decisions of associations of 
undertakings. A huge body of case law and decisional practice is available on 
the application of Article 101 TFEU. However, so far there are few if any EU 
level decisions or judgments concerning the cartel prohibition applied to
0~7healthcare with the exception of the pharmaceutical sector.27 There is thus 
little specific guidance for healthcare operators carrying out a self­
assessment under Article 101 (1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU. The main 
exceptions regarding the cartel prohibition are the Bayer and 
GlaxoSmithKline cases, both of which concern parallel imports of 
pharmaceuticals.28
. The Bayer Case (2004) concerned the question whether there were 
agreements between wholesale dealers and the aforementioned 
pharmaceutical concern for the purpose of frustrating parallel imports 
(between Spain and France on the one hand, and the United Kingdom 
on the other) in the sense of Article 101 TFEU - or whether unilateral 
conduct by Bayer was involved, and therefore potentially an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU on abuse of dominance.29 In the 
event of agreements price differentiation can result in an infringement 
of Article 101 TFEU. Maintaining a quota system on the other hand 
only infringes Article 102 TFEU in case of unilateral conduct and a
27 Cf. L. Hancher, “The EU pharmaceuticals markets: parameters and pathways” , in Health 
systems governance in Europe, above note 4. In 2008-2009 the pharmaceutical sector 
has been the subject of an industry-wide pan-EU sector inquiry by DG Competition 
concluded with a Commission Communication of 8 July 2009, Pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry report. This stated inter alia that it takes too long for generic medicines to reach 
the market and fewer innovative medicines are reaching the market, while there is an 
urgent need for an EU patent and patent-litigation system. The Commission will 
scrutinise the sector more closely and promote regulatory reform including at national 
level with regard to approval procedures, clinical trials, and the uptake of generic 
medicines. At both levels measures are to be taken to improve price competition.
2 8  In another case based on a prejudicial reference the Court found that Article 101 TFEU
read in concjuniction with Article 4(3) of the TEU (“effet utile”) did not apply to a Belgian 
ban on advertising for dentists. This is dealt with below under the relationship between 
EU and national rules. Case C-446/05, Criminal proceedings against Doulamis [2008] 
ECR I-1377.
29 Joined cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and 
Commission v Bayer AG [2004] ECR I-23; Case T-41/96, Bayer AG v Commission 
[2000] ECR II-3383.
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ondominant position.30 Hence in this case Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
are mutually exclusive. The Court held that in this case only 
anticompetitive behaviour by Bayer had been proven but that no 
convincing evidence regarding concurrence of wills between Bayer 
and its customers was available. Hence, Article 101 TFEU did not 
apply.
. GlaxoSmithKline (2009) similarly concerned the practice of the 
pharmaceutical company of maintaining differentiated prices in the 
Spanish market in order to block parallel imports (tariff arbitrage).31 
The Commission had established a breach of Article 101 TFEU on this 
basis, but in the view of the Court of Justice it had neglected to 
demonstrate that there was (tacit) acceptance and whether given the 
degree of regulation in place there was any room left for restrictions of 
competition.32 It is also worth noting that the General Court had in 
addition addressed the question whether restrictions of parallel 
imports deny the benefits thereof to consumers (or whether these 
benefits are substantial): given the existence of price regulation at 
national level the benefits appeared to accrue primarily to the parallel 
importers themselves. As a result, the General Court was of the 
opinion that agreements containing the restrictions to parallel trade did 
not have the object to restrict competition.33 By putting forward this 
point of view the General Court derogated from longstanding case law, 
according to which restrictions to parallel trade was considered to be a 
severe infringement of the cartel prohibition (‘hard core restriction’). 
The General Court based this decision on the view that consumer 
welfare is the only goal that matters in European competition law. The 
Court of Justice on the other hand indicated that apart from consumer 
welfare other goals (such as the market structure and competition 
itself) must be weighed and emphasized that territorial restrictions 
must be regarded as a restriction by object. However, at the end day 
the findings of the EC J and General Court did not differ substantially. 
After all, both Courts agreed that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU
30 In Case C-277/87, Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-45 the
fact that the message “export prohibited” was printed on all invoices was held to 
constitute proof of the existence of tacit acceptance of anticompetitive conduct..
31 Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline
Services Unlimited v Commission (C-501/06 P) and Commission v GlaxoSmithKline 
Services Unlimited (C-513/06 P) and European Association of Euro Pharmaceutical 
Companies (EAEPC) v Commission (C-515/06 P) and Asociación de exportadores 
españoles de productos farmacéuticos (Aseprofar) v Commission (C-519/06 P), 
judgment of 6 October 2009, nyr.
32 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969.
33 Finally, the General Court found adverse effects on competition (resulting from the
agreements under review). However, this did not call into question the change of 
approach towards restrictions to parallel trade, which used to be based on an absolute 
ban on such restrictions.
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was involved, while the Commission would have to collect more 
information in order to be able to decide whether the exception of 
Article 101(3) TFEU applied.34
This remarkable approach towards hard core restriction by the General Court 
was driven by the need to fine-tune the competition rules to the specific 
features of healthcare. It stressed that because insurers usually bear the 
healthcare costs the paradigm established in the old case law barring 
restrictions to parallel trade as a matter of principle in order to oppose market 
partitioning was not appropriate for solving pharmaceutical cases. In 
essence, the General Court’s attempted to accommodate healthcare-specific 
features in the application of the cartel prohibition. Given the gap between 
the innovative solution of the General Court and the long-standing settled 
case law, which dates back to traditional landmark decisions such as
qc
Grundig/Consten and firmly forbids restrictions to parallel trade in order to 
stimulate market integration, the decision of the EC J to overturn the General 
Court’s ruling did not come as a surprise. However it is a pity that the EC J did 
not express its views on how the classic approach towards restrictions of 
parallel trade could be tailored to healthcare but confined itself to general 
statements on the nature of EU competition law.
The pursuit of legitimate objectives
In other cases in different areas however, the EC J has developed an 
approach that pays due consideration to the special features of the sector 
involved. In the 2002 Wouters case,36 for example, it was called upon to 
review a decision taken by the Dutch Bar Association. The EC J said that for 
the purpose of the application of Article 101 TFEU
“(...) account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the 
decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects. 
More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, which are here 
connected with the need to make rules relating to organisation, qualifications, 
professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the 
ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of justice 
are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and 
experience (see, to that effect, Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede [1996] ECR I- 
6511, paragraph 38). It has then to be considered whether the consequential
3 4  Cf. J.W. van de Gronden, in EU Law and Healthcare, above note 26.
3 5  'Case 56/64, Etablissements Consten S.a.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission [1966] ECR 429.
3 6  Case C-309/99, J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten 
(Wouters) [2002] ECR I-1577.
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effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives.”.37
Eventually, the EC J held that that the decision taken by the Dutch Bar 
Association was necessary given the professional ethics at stake and 
therefore not contrary to the cartel prohibition.
In Meca-Medina (2006)38 the EC J even applied the approach developed in 
Wouters to sports. At issue were anti-doping rules and the plaintiffs had 
argued that these rules were contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. The EC J put 
forward that the anti-doping rules issued by sports associations do not
“(...) necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible with the 
common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, since they are justified 
by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and 
proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy
OQrivalry between athletes
Remarkably, the EC J referred in general wording to the need to achieve 
legitimate objectives (not: public objectives), which meant that competition 
law was not infringed.40 Hence, in other areas than healthcare the EC J 
seems to have developed an approach that is capable of accommodating 
issues of general interest in the application of European competition law. In
41principle this could apply to healthcare as well.41 For instance many 
healthcare providers are guided by a specific medical deontology (starting 
from the Hippocratic oath) and might apply rules that are “inherent” in the 
organisation of healthcare (one example might be rules prohibiting doctors 
from advertising42 or from using their qualifications in a non-medical setting). 
This maybe especially relevant in to agreements because dominance related 
issues are often addressed using the SG EI concept. However, the EC J has 
not given any guidance on the legitimate objectives approach might apply to 
healthcare cases.
3.2. Abuse of dominance
37 Ibid., para. 97.
oo
Case C-519/04P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission (Meca-Medina) 
[2006] ECR I-6991.
3 9  Ibid., para 45.
4 0  Ibid., para. 45.
41 See also J. Lear, E. Mossialos and B. Karl, EU competition law and health policy, in: E. 
Mossialos, G. Permanand, R. Baeten and T.K. Hervey (eds), above note 4, p. 356.
42 Of interest in this regard is the judgment of the General Court in case T-144/99, Institute of
Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office v Commission of the 
European Communities [2001] II-1087, where it held that a ban on comparative publicity 
issued by an association of professionals was justifiable in the light of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.
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Abuse of dominance concerns cases where a single undertaking has (or in 
exceptional cases several undertakings acting collusively have43) gained 
such a strong position on the relevant market that it is able to act 
independently from competitors, customers, suppliers and/or ultimately 
consumers.44 As is well-known, in order to determine whether a dominant 
position exists, the relevant market needs to be defined in two dimensions: 
the product market (e.g. hospital care) and the geographic market (e.g. a 
particular city or local area).45 A classical tool for defining the market is the 
SSN IP test (“small but significant non-transitory increase in price”), which is 
also frequently used by the Commission.46 This means that by way of a 
thought experiment (i.e. hypothetically) the price of the product concerned is 
increased by 5 to 10 percent and the reaction of customers is observed. If 
customers switch to other products and/or providers in significant numbers 
these products and/or their providers must be added to the market because 
they discipline the behaviour of the provider who is being investigated. This 
process is repeated until there is no longer any significant substitution: thus 
the market is determined.
From the perspective of healthcare markets the SSN IP test has significant 
drawback. The problems that are specific to healthcare especially in 
insurance based Bismarck systems as consumers do not directly bear the 
costs of their treatment on account of the “third party pays” principle. In this 
case the insurer pays the costs of the healthcare consumed and because 
there is no direct relationship between the premiums paid by the consumer 
his or her choices the latter are hardly affected by cost.
This problem is now being addressed at national level by health economists 
who have developed econometric models that are based for instance on the 
willingness of customers to travel to alternative providers (with additional 
travel time to next preferred options as the equivalent of a price increase), or 
their willingness to pay in order to include a particular provider in the package
43 A tight oligopoly of several large undertakings can lead to a position of collective
dominance: ( 1 ) the members must be able to observe each others behaviour closely; 
(2) there has to be an enforcement mechanism against deviant behaviour (e.g. punitive 
price reductions); and (3) it must be impossible for outsiders such as competitors or 
entrants to undermine the oligopoly. Case T-342/99, Airtours plc v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-2585.
44 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461. Cf. A. Ezrachi
(ed), Article 82 EC: reflections on its recent evolution (Hart Publishers, Oxford 2009).
45 Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community
competition law, OJ 1997, C372/5. It is also required that a significant part of the 
internal market is concerned. This would be the case for the entire territory of a Member 
State or part of a larger Member State. Important infrastructural bottlenecks such as a 
major sea- or airport can also constitute a significant part of the internal market. Cf. 
Case C-179/90, Merci convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA
[1991] ECR I-05889.
46 See the Commission Notice, above note 45, para 15 ff.
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of care available to them (which takes account of the role played by 
insurers).47 Market definition is not just crucial to determining the existence of 
dominance for abuse cases but also to merger cases (likewise largely based 
on dominance) and to a lesser extent cartel cases: especially when hardcore 
restrictions or restrictions by object are involved the exact definition of the 
market is less important.
However, these experiments are so far taking place purely at national level 
and the Commission has no significant experience with defining healthcare 
specific markets. This could give rise to challenges that the national models 
do not fit the European competition law framework and are not in line with 
general EU principles on market definition. At the same time national 
authorities cannot be blamed for trying out state of the art methods, in 
particular where e.g. in hospital markets traditional methods have proven
AO
untenable.48 Even if (as is likely the case) the new market definition methods 
are compatible with EU law it would be a pity if needless legal wrangles on 
this point arise just because the Commission relies on a very general Notice 
on a market definition dating from 1997. At the same time outcomes that 
could turn out to be incompatible with EU law are not hypothetical. For 
instance the Dutch NCA had to reconsider its approach towards the concept 
of undertaking in relation to sickness funds when the AOK Case49 showed 
that it had misinterpreted the settled case law on this concept.
It is well-known that dominance is determined on the basis of market shares
cn(the dividing line is 50%) and other factors such as the relative market 
share (as compared to the next largest competitors), countervailing market 
power, commercial (brands), technical (patents) and financial advantages 
(“deep pockets” or preferential access to capital). The existence of entry 
barriers as a result of law and regulation can also be relevant - especially in
47 Cf. M. Varkevisser, Patient choice, competition and antitrust enforcement in Dutch hospital
markets (PhD thesis, Rotterdam 2010); M. Varkevisser, C.S. Capps et al., “Defining 
hospital markets for antitrust enforcement: new approaches and their applicability to 
The Netherlands”, (2008) Health Economics, Policy and Law 7-29; Initially the Elzinga 
Hogarty test was applied based on the number of consumers that would travel from 
within a region to outside the region and vice versa. This method has been discredited 
in US merger practice, not least because in a 2006 case Professor Ken Hogarty himself 
testified that his method was not useful in health cases.
48 Ibid., and DOJ/FTC, Improving healthcare: a dose of competition (US Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2004). Between 1995 and 2004 the DOJ and 
FTC lost a score of hospital merger cases based on unsatisfactory geographic market 
definitions and ended up giving up on hospital care mergers as a result.
49 See the Decision of the Dutch NCA in case 347,Complaints of healthcare providers with
regard to abusive behaviour of health insurers, of 26 May 2005.
50 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para 60. With
reference to Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, above note 38, para 41: “(...) the view 
may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in themselves, and save in 
exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position.”
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highly regulated sectors such as healthcare. This may vary by which 
segment of the sector is concerned, for example entry in the hospital market 
is likely to be much more difficult than it would be for an individual medical 
practitioner (such as a general practitioner, a dentist or a physical therapist) 
requiring far lower investments and a much lighter regulatory burden. Finally, 
the behaviour of the undertaking concerned is relevant as well: if it is in a 
position to impose unilaterally profitable price increases that may constitute 
an important proof of the existence of a dominant position.
When it comes to abusive behaviour, two main types of such behaviour are 
generally distinguished: exploitation and exclusion. Exploitation may concern 
charging excessive prices (many times higher than costs and/or comparable 
prices51) with respect to consumers or other customers and has as its 
purpose to increase the profits of the undertaking enjoying a dominant 
position above competitive levels. Exclusion may concern predatory pricing 
(below costs52) or a price squeeze (not leaving a margin between consumer 
prices and the prices for key inputs) and aims to foreclose competition by 
pushing competitors out of the market, thereby creating the opportunity to 
subsequently exploit consumers (then deprived from alternatives). In recent 
years antitrust enforcers have generally given combating exclusionary 
abuses priority over correcting exploitative abuses. Accordingly, the 
European Commission has published extensive Guidance on its approach 
exclusion in a communication at the end of 2008.54 The reason behind this 
approach is that if exclusion is controlled effectively it will soon become 
superfluous to address exploitation because the latter problem will be solved 
by the market mechanism itself. In this context, ensuring that effective market 
entry is not foreclosed is important as well.
Interestingly, in its Guidance the Commission has indicated that reasons 
external to a dominant undertaking may be capable of justifying abusive 
behaviour. After all, the Commission has expressed its intention to apply an 
objective necessity test to cases of dominance. The Guidance even explicitly 
states that “(e)xclusionary conduct may, for example, be considered 
objectively necessary for health or safety reasons related to the nature of the
51 Such cases are highly exceptional at EU level. One such exception is provided by Joined 
cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, François Lucazeau et al. v Société des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) et al. [1989] ECR 2811.
52 Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369.
5 3  Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2008] ECR II-477.
5 4  See Press Release IP/08/1877 of 3 December 2008 ‘consumer welfare at heart of
Commission fight against abuses by dominant undertakings’. In the first half of 2009 this 
new Commission policy was published in the OJ: See Communication from the 
Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 
2009, C45/7.
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product in question.”55 At first sight the term “health or safety reasons” seems 
to relate to product safety. However, because the Commission does not 
explicitly limit the interpretation of “health or safety” to that context it cannot 
be excluded that healthcare interests other than those connected with 
product safety are capable of justifying abusive behaviour. Hence, the 
Commission’s Guidance on exclusionary behaviour has opened the door to 
invoking the objective of healthcare in order to justify a breach of Article 102 
TFEU. However, one swallow does not make a summer, and as the 
Commission has added that it is normally up to the public authorities to set 
and enforce health (and safety) standards it does not seem willing to apply 
the objective necessity test expansively.
So far the Commission has not acted against abuse of dominance with 
regard to healthcare providers or insurers. However in recent years it has 
taken action on several occasions in the pharmaceuticals sector, notably IMS 
Health56 and AstraZeneca.57 IMS Health however did not raise major 
healthcare specific issues but instead focussed on the (complex) relationship 
between IP rights and competition law. AstraZeneca manipulated the renewal 
procedures of its authorisations to the detriment of competing producers of 
generic substitutes as well as the shape in which its products were marketed 
to the detriment of parallel importers. Again the Commission decision did not 
lead to any guidance on the complex interplay between healthcare and 
competition law. Apart from this the Court has delivered a judgment in a 
preliminary procedure concerning the application of Article 102 TFEU with 
regard to pharmaceuticals which we will discuss in some more detail.
. In Sot. Lelos v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE (2008) the question was 
raised to what extent a pharmaceutical company was allowed to 
defend itself against parallel imports (arbitrage between “high price”
5 5  Ibid., para. 29 (Guidance).
5 6  Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004]
ECR I-5039. The Court decided that the owner of an the essential input is obligated to 
supply if the undertaking that has requested a license intends to use this to create a 
new product, if there is no objective justification for the refusal, and if the refusal 
eliminates all competition from the market. An interim measure was imposed in 
2003/741/EC: Commission Decision of 13 August 2003 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP D3/38.044 —  NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim 
measures), OJ 2003, L268/69
57
5 7  2006/857/EC: Decision of the Commission of 15 June 2005 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
C0MP/A.37.507/F3 —  AstraZeneca), OJ 2006, L332/24. This was in line with the norm 
established by the Court of Justice in Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission 
[1995] ECR I-743 which was relaxed by the General Court in Case T-201/04, Microsoft 
Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601.
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and “low price” Member States) by means of a refusal to supply.58 The 
Court took the position that regulation of pharmaceuticals does not 
remove the abusive character from every refusal by a pharmaceutical 
undertaking to fulfil the orders from wholesale traders that are involved 
in parallel exports. However, it should be able to take reasonable and 
proportionate measures to defend its own commercial interests.59 In 
this context the usual size of these orders given the size of the market 
involved and earlier commercial relations between the parties should 
be taken into account. Hence a measured response to parallel imports 
appears possible.
What is of further interest in the Sot. Lelos Case, is that the dominant 
pharmaceutical firm concerned had put forward the argument that measures 
needed to be taken in order to protect the planning and distribution of 
medicines in Greece. In the view of the Advocate-General, this undertaking 
had not succeeded “(...) to point to anything capable of tipping the balance in 
its favour, despite the fact that matters relating to the welfare of patients and 
the reduction of public health costs are deserving of special attention in the 
main proceedings”.60 From these wordings it could be derived that the 
Advocate General in the Sot. Lelos Case is not opposed to the idea that 
dominant undertakings take measures in order to protect legitimate 
objectives of healthcare. However, in this particular case the enterprise 
concerned has failed to substantiate its claim that its practices were in the 
benefit of the Greek healthcare system.
Like the Advocate General the EC J rejected this claim, but it took a different 
route in the reasoning on which it based its conclusion. After having taking 
into consideration the problems of shortage of medicines it explicitly stated 
that “(...) it would not be for the undertakings holding a dominant position but 
for the national authorities to resolve the situation, by taking appropriate and 
proportionate steps that were consistent with (...)” the applicable national and 
EU laws.61 Hence, it may be concluded that EC J rejects the idea that the 
pursuit of healthcare objectives may justify refusal to supply. This approach 
does not only contradict the findings of the Advocate General but it does also 
not match with the Commission’s Guidance on Art 102 TFEU mentioned 
earlier. As the EC J does not explain its position further, it is hard to 
understand why it did not opt for merely concluding that the claim of the 
undertaking concerned was not sufficiently supported by proof. Now the 
result is a contradiction between EU case law and Guidance on a significant
58 Joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE etal. v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE
[2008] ECR I-7139.
59 Ibid., paras 69-70.
60 Ibid., see para 119 of the Conclusion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
61 See para 75 of Sot.Lelos kai Sia EE, above note 50.
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issue, i.e. to what extent practices of dominant undertakings may be 
justifiable due to the need to pursue legitimate healthcare aims.
With this we have given a first indication of what the application of the EU 
abuse of dominance prohibition in healthcare implies. So far however it 
appears that for providers of healthcare and for insurers national rather than 
EU competition is being applied. What is more, no enough guidance is 
available in European competition law, when it comes to the role of the 
prohibition on the abuse of a dominant position in healthcare.
3.3. Mergers
The European system of merger control is based on ex ante examination. 
Mergers between undertakings of which the combined turnover exceeds 
certain predetermined thresholds have to be notified to the European 
Commission and must be vetted by it before they can be implemented.62 
Until that time the consummation of the merger concerned is prohibited (by 
the so-called stand-still clause). If a merger goes ahead nevertheless it can 
be dissolved at the orders of the Commission. The test applied when 
deciding on merger plans is whether the merger under review would lead to a 
significant impediment of competition, in particular as a result of the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position.63
Due to a combination of the European turnover thresholds and the relatively 
small scale of most healthcare providers in the EU (excepting the 
pharmaceutical sector where the Commission has vetted over 70 mergers so 
far) the Commission has taken only a limited number of formal merger
62 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, above note 7. “2. A concentration has a Community
dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5000 million; and (b) the aggregate 
Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more 
than EUR 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than 
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member 
State.
3. A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a 
Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2500 million;(b) in each of at least three 
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 100 million;(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the 
purpose of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 
million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its 
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. Ibid, 
Article 1, paras 2 and 3.
63 “A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market.” Ibid., Article 2, para 3.
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decisions in healthcare. Here we discuss two representative mergers of 
healthcare (equipment) providers.
. Johnson&Johnson/Guidant (2005): this second phase merger 
case revolved around the take-over of Guidant, a company 
specialised in the manufacture of medical equipment for 
cardiology, by Johnson&Johnson, a large provider of medical 
equipment that also has a strong position in the market for 
cardiological equipment. Both companies had their business seat 
in the United States.64 However because they would jointly occupy 
a dominant position on a number of markets the parties offered 
commitments - notably divesting certain businesses in the EU65 - 
in order to help a competitor into the market and to address the 
expected problems in a structural manner. On this basis the 
merger was cleared as compatible with the common market.
. Frenesius/Helios (2005): this case involved the takeover by 
Frenesius, a hospital chains operating worldwide, of Helios, a 
German hospital chain. Both operated emergency aid clinics as 
well rehabilitation clinics in Germany.66 The Commission did not 
proceed to a formal market definition as it found that given the lack 
of overlapping activities even the narrowest market definition 
(looking at even more specialised hospitals) would not result in 
competition issues. On the national market the parties would have 
a market share of less than 5%, while both parties were active in a 
very low number of local markets. Hence the merger was declared 
compatible with the internal market.
The pattern of the two mergers discussed is relatively clear. In both cases 
healthcare providers with worldwide operations were concerned which had 
cast their eye on markets in the EU. As liberalisation in the EU proceeds (as 
we believe eventually it will) this constellation is likely to appear more 
frequently. Insofar as this would promote effective, efficient and well 
capitalised entry that would be a welcome development from a liberalisation 
perspective.
64 Decision of the Commission of 25 August 2005 in Case no COMP/M.3687 -
Johnson&Johnson/Guidant, based on Article 8(2) of Regulation 139/2004.
65 This involved divestiture of all endovascular activities; the activities with regard to
steerable guidewires of Guidant in the EEA and either the activities of 
Johnson&Johnson with regard to “harvesting” bloodvessels and veins or the 
heartsurgical activities of Guidant or Guidant’s activities with relation to harvesting 
veins.
66 Decision of the Commission of 8 December 2005 in Case no COMP/M.4010 -  
Frenesius/Helios, based on Article 6(1)b of Regulation 139/2004.
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However, in order to get a clear picture on how the merger control rules are 
applied to healthcare it is necessary to cover several of the pharmaceutical 
mergers of which the Commission has handled a large number since the 
coming into force of the original merger control regulation in 1989 (now 
superseded by regulation 139/2004). This is a segment of the healthcare 
sector where consolidation is already well advanced.
. Astra/Zeneca (1999) concerned the merger between two 
undertakings from respectively Sweden and the United Kingdom that 
were active in research and development, production and sales of 
pharmaceutical products (in addition Astra produced medical 
equipment and Zeneca agricultural chemical products).67 The 
definition of the product markets was based on the anatomical 
therapeutic categorisation that is used by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). The parties made commitments to divest a 
number of activities (the production of combination beta blockers in 
the entire EEA  and a worldwide license for a certain local anaesthetic) 
or to grant third parties sales licenses (regular beta blockers in 
Sweden and Norway). On this basis the merger was considered 
compatible.
. In the merger case Novartis/Hexal (2005) between the Swiss 
undertaking Novartis and the German Hexal (and its sister undertaking 
EON labs in the United States) not just branded pharmaceuticals but 
also generic pharmaceuticals were concerned, and over the counter 
drugs as well as prescription drugs. Concerning generics this 
combination would even become the leading market participant in 
Europe. The conditions that were eventually imposed were that for 
calcitonines Hexal’s product Calcihexal had to be sold off in Poland, 
for topical anti-rheumatics Hexal’s product Diclac had to be sold in 
Germany and with regard to medicines against gout Hexal’s product 
Apurin had to be sold in Denmark (as well as possibly, at the buyer’s 
request, Hexal’s product Allopurinol). Just as the Astra/Zeneca case 
did the Novartis/Hexal case demonstrates that the Commission is 
likely to define pharmaceutical markets painstakingly in product 
markets and (usually national) geographical markets and to carefully 
craft its remedies accordingly.
67 Decision of the Commission of 26 February 1999 in Case no COMP/M.1403 -  
Astra/Zeneca, based on Article 6(1)b of Regulation 139/2004.
68 Decision of the Commission of 27 May 2005 in Case no COMP/M.3551 -Novartis/Hexal, 
based on Article 6(1)b of Regulation 139/2004.
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. GlaxoSmithKline/Stiefel laboratories (2009) regarded a merger 
between an undertaking seated in the UK (GKS) and another in the 
United States (Stiefel).69 Both were active not just in the area of 
pharmaceuticals but also produced other healthcare products for 
consumers. The noteworthy aspect of this case is that apart from the 
limited horizontal overlap between the parties their vertical 
relationships were also examined. This occurred because both parties 
were active not only in the production of drugs under contract for third 
parties but also in marketing drugs to consumers. However the 
Commission determined there was no risk of a significant restriction of 
competition and declared the merger compatible with the internal 
market.
As is already evident from this limited selection of cases the pharmaceutical 
sector is at a fundamentally different stage from the other healthcare 
providers. Here we find a very large scale industry with a reach that covers 
the entire EU and/or a worldwide scope. The geographical markets however 
still tend to be national due to the existence of national social security 
systems and the concomitant price regulation. Hence interaction between 
national regulatory regimes and EU competition policy occurs. (This is an 
important issue that has been underexposed and deserves separate 
coverage in a paper specifically on pharmaceuticals and competition law.)
To sum up, in the cases on mergers between pharmaceutical companies the 
Commission’s investigations concentrate on the consequences of the 
mergers for competition between original and generic medicines and for 
research and development. Further, a couple of hospital mergers and 
mergers of companies that offer hospital related products or services were 
notified to the Commission. Given the low markets shares and the limited 
overlap of the activities of the parties concerned, the Commission cleared 
these mergers70 and was, as a result, not forced to decide on tensions 
between competition and healthcare objectives. In some cases, the parties to 
the merger solved competition problems resulting from overlap of healthcare
71activities by relying on a classic method, i.e. offering remedies. Hence, the
69 Decision of the Commission of 17 June 2009 in Case no COMP/M.5530 -
GlaxoSmithKline/Stiefel laboratories, based on Article 6(1)b of Regulation 139/2004.
70 See e.g. Decision of the Commission of 21 August 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4788 -
Rozier/BHS, based on Art. 6(1)(b of Regulation 139/2004; Decision of the Commission 
of 13 December 2006 in Case No Case COMP/M.4418 -  Nycomed Group/Altana 
Pharma, based on Art. 6(1)(b of Regulation 139/2004; and the Press Release of the 
Commission of 9 December 2005 on the merger between Helios and Fresenius, 
IP/05/1553.71
See e.g. Decision of the Commission of 16 March 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4367 -  
APW/APSA/Nordic Capital/ CAPIO, based on Art. 6(1)(b of Regulation 139/2004 with 
conditions and obligations; and Decision of the Commission of 15 July 2008 in Case No
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Commission was not called upon to deal with tensions between competition 
and healthcare issues. What is more, so far the Union courts have not 
delivered any judgements on merger cases that involved healthcare 
operators.
Although the case law of the European Courts and the Commission decisions 
are silent on the relationship between competition and healthcare objectives, 
the Guidelines issued by the Commission on horizontal and non-horizontal
"70mergers72 shed some light on reasons that may be invoked in order to justify 
restrictions of competition. Would these guidelines be useful in merger cases 
that involve a clash between competition and healthcare objectives?
In its guidelines the Commission states that efficiencies may make the 
Commission decide that a merger is compatible with the internal market, if
7 0the consumers are not worse off as a result of the merger. Hence the point 
of departure is the consumer welfare test. The Commission points out that 
cost reduction and gains in the sphere of research and development are 
regarded as efficiencies. In the approach set out by the Commission in the 
guidelines therefore mainly benefits of an economic nature are regarded as 
justification for competition restrictions caused by mergers. However at least 
in theory efficiencies are not well-suited to resolve tensions between 
competition and healthcare objectives in merger cases such as may be 
related to securing or improving quality, to minimum scale required to 
perform certain types of operations or to vertical integration. After all, these 
kinds of problems, which are likely to arise, are not merely related to 
economic benefits; rather they are rooted in non-market concerns. Hence, for 
the merger control rules the same conclusions must be drawn as for antitrust: 
the rules do not provide a coherent approach as to how to deal with 
healthcare concerns.
3.4. The relationship between the EU competition rules and national 
rules
Below we will look at several aspects of the relationship between EU 
competition law and national (competition) law. This mainly concerns the 
“effet utile” (or useful effect) as well as the CIF jurisprudence and the 
question when public involvement in the markets protects the undertakings to 
which it applies from the competition rules (the “state action doctrine”). The 
powers of national competition authorities with regard to the EU competition 
rules will also be addressed briefly.
COMP/M.5190 -  Nordic Capital/ConvaTec, based on Art. 6(1)(b of Regulation 139/2004 
with conditions and obligations.
72 Guidelines of the Commission on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ 2004 C31/5.
73 Ibid, point 79.
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National and EU competition law
All EU Member States now have national competition authorities (NCAs) who 
are empowered and obligated to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in cases 
where trade between the Member States may be affected.74 In such cases 
the Commission must be notified, and may itself take control of the case at
•ytzany point where it believes this is warranted. The NCAs are also members 
of the so-called network of EU competition authorities (ECN) that is 
coordinated by the European Commission. These are the results of the 
modernisation of EU antitrust based on Regulation 1/2003 which combines 
rationalisation (a greater emphasis on economic reasoning) and prioritisation 
(more emphasis on hardcore cartels) with systemic reform based on a 
combination of decentralisation and coordination. Meanwhile all Member 
States have also adopted national competition laws which are often carbon 
copies of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (a process called spontaneous 
harmonisation). According to Regulation 1/2003 these national rules may not 
be stricter than the EU rules, unless they apply to unilateral conduct.76 
Hence, the national competition authorities have to apply both European 
competition law and national competition rules inspired by their TFEU 
equivalents.
In section 2 it was outlined that due to the E C J’s settled case law on the 
concept of undertaking the door is wide open for applying competition law to 
healthcare cases. This is a significant finding for the NCAs, since they are 
obliged to interpret the concept of undertaking in the light of this case law. 
This is not only true for Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU cases but also in 
matters involving the national competition rules. After all, these national rules 
are modelled in line with EU competition law, which implies that the national 
concept of undertaking is identical to the one developed in the E C J’s 
jurisprudence. As the majority of the healthcare cases are of a national or 
sub-national nature, the national competition authorities are required to apply 
the broad concept of undertaking and as a result to develop healthcare- 
specific approaches to competition law.
Guidance
As was already mentioned the European Commission is at the centre of the 
network of national regulators (ECN) and can trump the procedures of the 
NCAs by taking over in important cases, or in cases where its views diverse
74 Articles 3 and 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, above note 5.
75 Ibid., Articles 11 and 12. Cf. Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities, OJ 2004, C101/43. Amicus curiae interventions by the 
Commission in national court proceedings are also foreseen: Commission Notice on the 
co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004, C101/54.
76 Ibid., Article 3(2).
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significantly from that of the NCA involved. Policy convergence is actively 
promoted within the ECN. At the same time undertakings have to perform 
self-evaluation of their agreements and national courts may be called upon to 
decide issues of EU competition law. Consequently the Commission has 
taken upon itself to provide extensive and regularly updated guidance on 
such issues as vertical and horizontal restraints and exclusionary abuses.77 
On vertical and horizontal mergers (even though these are not covered by 
the modernization of antitrust) the Commission has likewise issued detailed
yo
explanatory communications. Market definition has also been the subject of 
a 1997 Commission Notice, albeit by now arguably outdated.79
So far, sectoral guidance remains relatively rare and where it exists is not
on
always kept up to date,80 albeit with the significant recent exceptions of
OH
distribution agreements in the automobile industry01 and regarding the
no
insurance industry.82 Other exceptions are the liberalised network sectors 
such as electronic communications where during the initial liberalisation
QOphase and the transition period more guidance tends to be provided. In any 
event, apart from the general guidance just mentioned, there is no specific 
guidance available to NCAs applying the EU competition rules to the 
healthcare sector, even while the broad application of the concept of 
undertaking opens previously sheltered field up to application of the 
competition rules. Likewise in the state aid field - where by contrast there is a
77 Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article
81(3) of the Treaty, OJ 2004, C101/97; Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 
2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ 2010, 
L102/1; Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ 2010, C130/1; 
Commission Notice - Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal co­
operation agreements, OJ 2001, C3/2; Guidance on enforcement against exclusionary 
conduct, above note 47.
78 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on
the control of concentrations between undertakings OJ 2008, C265/6; Guidelines on the 
assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings OJ 2004, C31/5,
79 Notice on market definition, above note 45.
80 E.g. Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal
sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, OJ 
1998, C39/2
81 Commission Regulation (EU) 461/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ 2010, L129/52
oo
Commission Regulation (EC) of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the 
insurance sector, OJ 2010, L83/1.
83 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, OJ 2002, C165/6; Notice on the application of the competition 
rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector - framework, relevant 
markets and principles, OJ 1998, C265/2; Guidelines on the application of EEC 
competition rules in the telecommunications sector, OJ 1991, C233/2.
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wide range of sectoral guidance documents84 - the Commission does not 
provide specifics for healthcare.
Effet utile
Given the degree of government involvement in healthcare the “effet utile” 
(useful effect) case law is relevant. This is the case law which demonstrates 
that Member States may infringe their duty of sincere cooperation under 
Article 4(3) TEU if a Member State requires or encourages the adoption of 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 101 TFEU or 
reinforces their effects, or where it divests its own rules of the character of 
legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for 
taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.85 The corollary of this 
doctrine is that if collusive behaviour is imposed on undertakings by public 
authorities, the private parties concerned accordingly escape liability under 
the competition rules (i.e. they may invoke a “state action defence”), unless 
they had sufficient margin of freedom to engage in some competition but
oc
snuffed this out at their own initiative.00
In the Belgian Doulamis Case in 2008 the Court held that a law prohibiting 
advertising by dentists did not involve a breach of the effet utile of the 
competition rules because a direct link with private restraints of competition
Q -7
could not be shown. This Belgian case shows - in line with settled case
Q Q
law - that for the useful effect doctrine to be applicable a link should exist 
between on the one hand the restrictive state measures at hand and on the 
other hand particular practices of undertakings. In other Member States, such 
as the Netherlands, tariff setting based on agreements between the 
government and bodies of medical practitioners may be vulnerable to the 
effet utile rule if restrictive agreements between the practitioners are 
promoted by the government in the process. After all, in the light of the useful 
effect doctrine it is questionable whether tariff agreements concluded 
between undertakings are compatible with EU competition law (in so far as 
they affect the trade between Member States). The limits of what may be 
permissible are set out in the Arduino (2002) and Cipolla (2006) cases on the
Q Q
remuneration of Italian lawyers. These cases show that apart from the
84 With (sometime multiple) separate documents covering agriculture, audiovisual
production, broadband broadcasting, the coal industry, electricity, financial services, 
fisheries, postal services, shipbuilding, steel, synthetic fibres and transport.
85 Case 267/86, Pascal Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] ECR 4769.
86 Joined cases C-359/95 P and C-379/95 P, Commission and France v Ladbroke Racing
Ltd. [1997] ECR I-6265.
87 Case C-446/05, Doulamis, above note 28.
88 See e.g. C-245/91, Criminal proceedings against Ohra Schadeverzekeringen NV [1993] I-
5851 and case C-2/91, Criminal proceedings against Wolf W. Meng [1993] I-5751.
89 Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino [2002] ECR I-1529; Joined
Cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Federico Cipolla against Rosaria Portolese and Stefano 
Macrino and Claudia Capoparte against Roberto Meloni [2006] ECR I-11421.
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possibility for public authorities to intervene ex ante (before a particular 
measure is taken) in the general interest it must be possible for public 
authorities to take a decision in place of the one proposed by market parties 
as well (e.g. for judges to adjust rates at a later stage).
The direct effect of the doctrine of effet utile
It is common ground that the EU competition rules have direct effect. This 
means that they can be invoked by citizens before national courts. In 
addition, as already mentioned above, the NCAs are obliged to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at national level in cases that have a European 
dimension.90 Application of EU provisions having direct effect by public 
bodies is in fact inherent in the concept of direct effect.
The 2003 CIF Case is relevant here as it creates a supplementary 
responsibility under EU law for NCAs as well as (arguably) other national
Q1regulators. In the 1989 Fratelli Costanzo case the Court had already 
decided that all public bodies, not only domestic courts but also national 
administrative authorities, such as municipalities, were obliged to apply 
European law and to set aside those provisions of national law that were at
QO
odds with provisions of EU law having direct effect.92 In CIF this was 
confirmed with regard to the useful effect doctrine discussed above, which 
means that the undertakings that had so far been protected by the state 
action doctrine would henceforth become liable under EU competition law 
(albeit not for the period preceding intervention by the NCA). It remains an 
open question whether this obligation only rests with the national authorities 
(the NCAs) that have powers to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or whether 
also other authorities such as healthcare regulators (which may for instance 
have powers regarding SM P) have the authority and, as result, the duty to 
take action against national measures that are in violation of Article 4 (3) EU 
in conjunction with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
In any event, it is clear that on the basis of the useful effect doctrine NCA’s 
may set aside national healthcare interventions that are of a mixed public- 
private nature. This possibility raises concerns as EU law does not provide
90 Regulation 1/2003, above note 5, Article 3(1) “Where the competition authorities of the
Member States or national courts apply national competition law to agreements, 
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the 
meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article 81 of the Treaty to such 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Where the competition authorities of the 
Member States or national courts apply national competition law to any abuse 
prohibited by Article 82 of the Treaty, they shall also apply Article 82 of the Treaty.”
91 Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante della
Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR I-8055.
92 Case 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Comune di Milano en Impresa Ing. Lodigani Spa
[1989] ECR 1839.
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guidance on whether and to what extent healthcare objectives are 
accommodated by European competition law. A NCA and a national 
healthcare body that is (partly) of a private nature but also legitimised by 
public law may be involved in a dispute on the compatibility of a particular 
national measure with European competition law. An example could be 
collectively negotiated doctor’s rates (dubious as doctors are in principle 
undertakings) backed up by a related public adjustment of hospital budgets 
with a view to containing overall costs. Because the case law of the EC J and 
the General Court and the decisional practice of the Commission do not 
clearly address competition law and healthcare, it remains uncertain how 
such a dispute should be settled. I.e. EU law does not clearly instruct 
domestic courts that may have to rule on such disputes.
4. State aid
The state aid regime is designed to prevent the disruption of competitive 
conditions in the EU by the lack of a level placing field because some
n oundertakings are favoured over others by public authorities. In contrast to 
the three policies just discussed in relation to cartels, abuse of dominance 
and mergers the state aid regime generally does not have a national 
equivalent. This is logical, not just because national governments would then 
have to police themselves (which might be feasible for the national 
government and regional or local bodies, or for a specialised body) but also 
in view of the political sensitivity of aid. Nevertheless state aid policy plays an 
increasingly important role, and apart from the centralised enforcement by 
the Commission interested parties can also appeal to national courts (which 
can establish whether there is aid that has not been notified, and hence is 
per se illegal), so some degree of decentralised enforcement is possible.
It is a well known fact that the EC J has interpreted the prohibition not to grant 
state aid expansively. The concept state aid encompasses in the view of the 
ECH not only positive benefits such as subsidies but also interventions which 
mitigate the charges that are normally included in the budget of the company 
concerned.94 So, both the concept state aid and the term undertaking (see 
above) are subject to broad definition and, as a result, many national 
measures in order to finance the provision of healthcare may fall within the 
scope the EU state aid regime.
It is clear that the broad definitions given by the EC J raise state aid issues in 
healthcare. Which conditions must be fulfilled for a measure to be caught by
Cf. van de Gronden (state aid), above note 8 . More generally cf. A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout 
and J. Flynn (eds), The Law of State Aid in the European Union (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004)
94 See Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the 
Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 1 and case C-39/94, Syndicat français de 
l'Express international (SFEI) et al. v La Poste et al. [1996] ECR I-3547.
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the prohibition contained in Art 107 (1) TFEU (not to grant state aid to 
undertakings)? It is settled case law that this prohibition is applicable if a 
national measure meets four cumulative conditions:
1. Aid must be granted by the state or through state resources
2. It must confer an advantage to particular (selected) undertakings 
(sometimes this is seen as two separate conditions)
3. The aid must affect trade between the Member States
4. And it must distort competition in the common market.95
Although all these conditions are evidently important it is especially the 
second one (advantage/selectivity) that has been most controversial, both in 
general - in the wake of the Altmark judgment of 2003 and its follow-up - and 
in healthcare in particular.
The Altmark exception
The Altmark Case concerned the licensing conditions for regional transport in 
Germany.96 In this case the Court determined that if the undertaking 
concerned performed a universal service in exchange for the financing 
concerned there could be no question of state aid but only of compensation 
provided for performance of a service. In order to meet the four Altmark 
conditions:
1. The undertaking must have clearly defined public service obligations 
(PSO ) to discharge
2. The parameters for compensation must be established in advance in 
an objective and transparent manner
3. Compensation cannot exceed the costs of the PSO  and a reasonable 
rate of return
4. The undertaking must be selected by public procurement procedures, 
or meet the standard of a comparable efficient undertaking
In the event that these cumulative conditions are not met (generally 
undertakings stumble at the hurdle of the efficiency requirement that is the 
fourth Altmark condition) there may be a finding of state aid but there is still a 
possibility that this aid can be declared compatible with the internal market 
based on the SG EI exception of Article 106(2) TFEU. The Commission has 
clarified its policy with regard to the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to
Cf. Case C-475/99, Glöckner, above note 13.
96 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Altmark) [2003] ECR I-7747. This pursued the line set out in 
CaseC-53/00, Ferring SA v Agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale 
(ACOSS) [2001] ECR I-9067. Cf. F. Louis and A. Vallery, “Ferring revisited: the Altmark 
Case and State financing of public service obligations”, (2004) World Competition 53; A. 
Sinnaeve, “State financing of public services: the Court’s dilemma in the Altmark Case”, 
(2003) European State Aid Law Quartely 351.
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compensation in the state aid context by means of its so-called SGEI 
package (at the time also known as the Monti package). This consists of a 
Commission Decision and a Framework of 2005.97
In this Decision the duty to notify potential aid is lifted inter alia for all hospital 
care that is designated as a SG EI and aid may be disbursed prior to 
Commission vetting (i.e. the normal standstill rule does not apply here). The 
framework applies to those cases that do not benefit from the special regime 
of the Decision with regard to notification but as far as its substantive criteria 
are concerned is identical, e.g. with regard to the amount of compensation, 
the relevant costs to take into account, the meaning of reasonable rate of 
return, and overcompensation. This will be dealt with in more detail in the 
section on SG EI.
Decisions
Against this background we will discuss three important recent Commission 
Decisions concerning healthcare and state aid.
(i) Risk equalisation Ireland
This case concerned the Irish system of risk equalisation between private 
providers of supplementary healthcare insurance who were subject to a 
public framework of open enrolment, lifetime cover, community rating and
Q Q
minimum benefits. According to the Commission the risk equalisation 
system in principle met the four conditions for state aid in Article 107(1) 
TFEU.99 As this Decision was drafted prior to the Court’s findings in Altmark 
the Commission based itself on an early version of the compensation 
doctrine set out in Ferring.100 Although there was no question of explicit act of 
entrustment setting out a SG EI the Commission was prepared to derive this 
(implicitly) from the general regulatory context. The public service obligation 
was found to have been formulated in the obligations cited above, and the 
Commission also held that apart from the classical SG EI where a single
97 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC
Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest OJ 
2005, L312/67; Community framework for State aid in the form of public service 
compensation, OJ 2005, C297/4. This framework is now subject to a (2010) 
Commission consultation which also looks at the relationship between aid, 
compensation and public procurement.
98 Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2003 with regard to state aid N 46/2003 -  Ireland -
risk equalisation scheme in the Irish health Insurance market.
99 Although this concerned transfers between the insurers these were regarded as
concerning state resources because it concerned contributions that were imposed by 
public law and managed and distributed by the State in accordance with those legal 
instruments. Cf. Case C-114/91, Criminal proceedings against Gérard Jerôme Claeys
[1992] ECR I-6559; Joined cases C-114/91 en C-145/91, Gilbert Demoor en Zonen NV 
et al. v Belgium [1992] ECR I-6613.
100 Case C-53/00, Ferring, above note 96.
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undertaking is charged with providing public services in an entire national 
territory at comparable rates and quality, it was also possible to impose 
public service obligations on all the operators in a particular market. This 
meant the Irish government had not committed a manifest error in designing 
its system of supplementary health insurance.
According to the Commission, the risk equalisation system that was being 
examined also met the requirements of necessity and proportionality, the 
latter because a certain incentive towards efficiency had been retained by the 
fact that compensation was based on the market average (making it 
attractive to perform better than average) and because new entrants were 
granted a holiday from contributing during their first three years in the market. 
Hence the Commission concluded (i) that compensation was involved, rather 
than selective advantage, and therefore no state aid was found to exist, but 
(ii) that if the latter were to be found to exist anyway the aid concerned would 
be compatible with the internal market based on Article 106(2) TFEU. This 
decision was to be tested before the General Court in the BUPA Case that 
will be discussed in the section on SG EI.101
(ii) Risk equalisation and Financial reserves the Netherlands 
In this 2005 Case the new Dutch framework for health insurance was under 
evaluation, specifically the aspects whereby private insurers would cover the 
entire population in the context of the application of a risk equalisation 
system, and where moreover the formerly public or cooperative insurers
when being transformed into private entities would be allowed to keep their
10'?financial reserves. In contrast to the Irish system that was fully based on 
private insurance premiums the Dutch insurers receive half their financing 
from a public fund which is fed by income related social insurance 
contributions that are withheld at the source. The relevant framework was 
that of publicly defined minimum benefits, public supervision, national 
coverage, open enrolment and community rating. In this system the risk 
equalisation system compensates for the open enrolment obligation, at 50%
1 mof the expected costs, and ex post. This was seen as a system of double 
solidarity: among the insured population and between persons with various 
income levels (progressive financing). The capital requirements were linked 
to solvability ratios imposed on private insurers.
101 Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) et al. v Commission
[2008] ECR II-81.
102 Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 with regard to state aid N 541/2004 en N 
542/2004 -  The Netherlands -  risk equalisation system and retention of reserves.
103 The Commission took a positive view on this. Normally ex ante compensation is desirable 
in order to retain incentives for efficiency and any ex post compensation should be 
limited to the necessary minimum.
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The Commission decided that in this case (unlike in AOK, discussed above) 
the risk equalisation system did not restrict competition but instead promoted 
it. When it applied the Altmark criteria however it found that the fourth 
(efficiency) condition had not been met, because in principle all insurers 
received compensation, irrespective of their efficiency. The reserves were 
(partly) considered as aid. The same applied to the risk equalisation system.
Therefore this case was dealt with based on the SG EI exception in Article 
106(2) TFEU as far as the risk equalisation aspect was concerned. Just as in 
the Irish Case that was just discussed the Commission was prepared to 
derive the existence of a SG EI from the general legal and regulatory context, 
although in this case it explicitly held that the Member State tried to realise its 
public objectives by means of obligations and objective constraints that it 
imposed on the undertakings involved.104 It also held that the risk 
equalisation system was necessary to maintain stability in the market and to 
guarantee universal access to affordable healthcare. Because the 
compensation involved would be limited to the necessary minimum the 
proportionality test was met as well.
The retention of the financial reserves was evaluated based on Article 
107(3)c TFEU (aid for the development of certain types of economic activity). 
On this count the Commission held that the retention of the reserves on the 
one hand had only limited negative effects on competition and on the other 
hand formed an essential element of the liberalisation of the health Insurance 
markets in The Netherlands. Hence the Commission rules that the Dutch 
measures were compatible with Article 106(2) respectively 107(3) TFEU.
(iii) Brussels’ hospitals
This case concerned compensation payments to the public hospitals in the 
Brussels’ metropolitan region (IRIS-Z) in order to cover costs that according 
to the Commission were necessary to cover the costs of PSO for intramural 
(hospital) care that were based on the hospital care act.105 Remarkably in this 
case the hospitals (or more in particular their board which consisted mainly of 
representatives of the Brussels’ municipalities’ social services) had entrusted 
the SG EI that were alleged to have been involved - especially the 
commitment to treating all patients who presented themselves irrespective of 
the degree of emergency, financial considerations of their social situation - to
104 With reference to Case C-157/94, Commission v the Netherlands (Almelo) [1997] ECR I-
5699, para 40.
105 Decision of the Commission of 28 October 2009 with regard to state aid NN 54/2009 (ex
CP 244/2005) -  Belgium -  financing of public hospitals of the IRIS-network of the 
Brussels capital region.
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themselves.106 In exchange the IRIS-Z, based on the hospital care act, 
enjoyed supplementary funding on top of their normal budget that was 
awarded to private hospitals as well. Because this funding was in practice 
paid out only after a ten year delay it was paid by way of a temporary 
advance by the Brussels region.
According to the Commission all conditions for finding state aid were met, but 
the (likewise cumulative) Altmark conditions were not. It did find the existence 
of a PSO  based on the compulsory nature of the service provided to all
1 n~7comers at identical conditions, although only part of the population was
10ftcovered. Just as in the Dutch case just discussed, the fourth Altmark 
condition of public procurement or fining based on the needs of an efficient 
undertaking however was not met. Hence the measures concerned 
constituted state aid that was next vetted with regard to its compatibility with 
the demands of the aforementioned SG EI package. This meant examining:
. Necessity
. Parameters for compensation established in advance 
. Proportionality
. Accounting separation and no cross-subsidies 
. Checking for overcompensation.
On this basis the Commission declared the aid involved to be compatible with 
the internal market.
The point of view of the General Court: the BUPA case 
To conclude this section it is important to address the BUPA case that was 
decided by the General Court in 2008.109 BUPA was a private health insurer 
that entered the Irish market for voluntary supplementary private health 
insurance covered some 50% of the population and was dominated by VHI, a 
former monopolist. Although BUPA was much smaller than VHI the risk 
equalisation system that the Commission had approved in its Decision on the 
Irish scheme that was discussed above was triggered to the advantage of 
VHI. Consequently BUPA both challenged the Commission’s Decision before 
the General Court and appealed the relevant Irish decisions before the Irish 
courts. The Commission Decision was upheld by the General Court based on
106 The responsible public bodies, the municipal social services administrations have
delegated this authority to the regional board for inter-hospital infrastructural 
collaboration (IRIS).
107 “The compulsory nature of the service and, accordingly, the existence of an SGEI mission 
are established if the service-provider is obliged to contract, on consistent conditions, 
without being able to reject the other contracting party, which does not exclude that the 
undertakings enjoys a certain freedom in the market with respect to the management 
and the content of the services concerned.” Commission Decision NN 54/2009, above 
note 98, para 149, with reference to Case T-289/03, BUPA, above note 101, para 190.10ft
With reference to Case T-289/03, BUPA, above note 101, para 186.
109 Ibid. Annotated by W. Sauter in (2009) Common Market Law Review 269.
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belt and braces approach, i.e. not only with respect to the Altmark criteria 
(which is all the more remarkable as at the time of the Commission Decision 
these did not yet exist) but also based on the SGEI criteria. Not much later 
the Irish Supreme Court found the risk equalisation system unconstitutional. 
BUPA was not much aided by this as it withdrew from the Irish market.
As regards the Altmark criteria it is noteworthy that the General Court in 
relation to the first criterion (the existence of a PSO ) did not demand that the 
service concerned was available to the entire population of the Member State 
concerned: instead the obligation to deal with all comers at standard 
conditions (open enrolment) was considered sufficient to find the existence of 
a universal service. The fact that different services with price differentiation 
were concerned did not mitigate this consideration, nor did even the fact that 
not all consumers (in fact almost half of the population) either could or would 
pay for these services. The second criterion requires clearly defined 
parameters for compensation and was not contested. The necessity and 
proportionality of the compensation were more difficulty to establish in the 
absence of a direct link between the universal service and the need for 
compensation. Here the General Court accepted that the arrangement was 
“consistent with the purpose and the spirit of the third Altmark condition in so 
far as the compensation is calculated on the basis of elements which are 
specific, clearly identifiable and capable of being controlled”.110 Likewise with 
respect to the fourth Altmark condition the General Court formulated an 
alternative version because it would not be possible to determine in advance 
which insurer had a right to compensation and therefore to compare its costs 
with those of an efficient competitor. Because compensation was based on 
the average costs in the market (and not on those of the individual 
competitor) an incentive toward efficiency would be retained.
In this manner the General Court substantially amended the relatively recent 
Altmark criteria in the first important case where they were applied - in the 
sense that it broadened their scope. By contrast several other aspects of the 
case, such as the scope for market entry, and the undesirable effects of ex 
post compensation, were not addressed. In any event, by moderating the 
fourth Altmark condition the General Court has put pressure on the approach 
of the Commission adopted in its three healthcare decisions discussed 
above. In these decisions the Commission started from a strict reading of the 
criterion of the costs of a well-run company. As long as the EC J has not shed 
any light on this matter, it remains unsolved whether this condition should be 
applied in a strict or lenient manner.




Nevertheless the state aid regime, unlike that of competition law strictu sensu 
has been largely clarified in relation to healthcare, and repeatedly applied. As 
we have seen this hinges in large part on the use of SGEI, a concept that is 
of broader application and will next be discussed in more detail. In this 
respect it should be noted that guidance on issues of state aid and 
healthcare is less urgent than guidance on other competition and healthcare 
matters, since at the national level a regime equivalent to Articles 107-109 
TFEU is generally absent.
5. Services of general economic interest and universal service 
obligations
The state aid cases discussed here clearly show that services of general 
economic interest (SG EI) could play an important role in issues of health care 
and competition. SGEI is a EU law concept that serves to bridge the gap 
between legitimate national public interest objectives on the one hand and 
the EU Treaty rules on free movement, competition and state aid on the 
other.111 By entrusting an undertaking with a SG EI public authorities at 
national level can charge it with carrying out public service obligations, in 
particular the provision of a universal service. This allows for a proportionate 
exception to the rules of the Treaty. Because SG EI is an exception to the 
general rules it is applied restrictively, but the Court is sensitive to the 
economic context involved.
The SG EI concept and the universal service obligations that are at its heart 
have played a key role in the liberalisation of the network industries (such as 
electronic communications and energy). If liberalisation of healthcare spreads 
within the EU, the SGEI concept is likely to play an important role here as 
well because in this manner mixed regimes that guarantee essential 
provision on equitable terms can be sustained, while defining the universal 
service concerned is likely to facilitate allowing a market-based regime for the 
remaining services. Ambulance transport and risk equalisation between 
insurers are areas where SGEI have so far been applied in healthcare.112 
Some other areas of healthcare may likewise be candidates for the 
application of SGEI. We will first elaborate on the concept of SG EI before 
discussing some reasons why it may be especially significant for healthcare.
111 Cf. T. Prosser, “EU competition law and public services”, in Health systems governance
in Europe, above note 4; W. Sauter, “Services of general economic interest and 
universal service in EU law” (2008) European Law Review 167 and M. Krajewski, U. 
Neergaard and J.W. van de Gronden (eds), The changing legal framework for services 
of general economic interest in Europe (Asser Press, The Hague 2008).
112 Case C-475/99, Glöckner, above note 13; Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2003
with regard to state aid N 46/2003 -  Ireland -  risk equalisation scheme in the Irish 
health Insurance market; Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 with regard to 
state aid N 541/2004 en N 542/2004 -  The Netherlands -  risk equalisation system and 
retention of reserves; Case T-289/03, BUPA, above note 101.
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The role of SGEI in EU law
The SG EI concept is derived from Article 106(2) TFEU, which provides a 
proportionate exception to the free movement, competition and state aid 
rules for undertakings charged with SGEI. The Commission is charged with 
supervising the application of Article 106 TFEU as a whole, which also 
concerns revenue producing monopolies, public undertakings and 
undertakings enjoying special and exclusive rights. It can adopt Decisions 
and Directives to do so: a relevant example is its 2005 Decision on public 
service compensation in the SGEI package, discussed above.113 Also 
relevant are Article 14 TEU, which creates a legal basis for European 
Parliament and Council Regulations on SGEI, Article 36 of the Charter of 
fundamental rights of the EU, and Protocol no. 26 on Services of General 
Interest that was added to the Lisbon Treaty. The legality of SG EI is tested 
based on necessity and proportionality. This involves balancing the non­
economic interest invoked by the Member State against the (economic) 
Community interest.
Defining SGEI
Neither a standard definition of SGEI nor a limited list of such services exists. 
Moreover the element “economic” in the definition refers to the service 
involved (as it is provided by an undertaking) and not to the public interest 
involved. This leaves broad scope for Member States to define SGEI. It is a 
dynamic concept which means that services may over time come to be 
regarded as SGEI, or vice versa cease to be so. This allows technical, 
economic and socio-political developments to be taken into account.
Nevertheless it is important to note that a clear definition of the SGEI and an 
act of entrustment are required as constitutive elements of creating a SGEI. 
This has been clear at least since the 2003 Altmark judgment,114 as well as 
the Commission’s 2005 Altmark package, which were both discussed in the 
previous section on state aid.115 In this context it is worth repeating that the 
Commission Decision explicitly creates the possibility of exempting hospital 
financing from the state aid notification obligation provide its compensation is 
proportionate to the costs concerned, but otherwise irrespective of the 
amounts involved, provided these services are designated as SG E I.116
113 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC
Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation, above note 97.
114 Case C-280/00, Altmark, above note 89; cf. Case C-53/00, Ferring, above note 96.
115 Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC
Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation, above note 90; and 
Community framework, above note 97.
116 “Accordingly hospitals providing medical care, including, where applicable, emergency 
services and ancillary services directly related to the main activities, notably in the field 
of research (...), should benefit from the exemption from notification provided for in this 
Decision, even if the amount of compensation they receive exceeds the thresholds laid 
down in this Decision, if the services performed are qualified as services of general
37
This last aspect still tends to be more honoured in the breach than in the 
observance, and as we have seen the Commission is as a consequence 
often prepared to derive the existence of SGEI from the broader regulatory 
context. Also in BUPA the General Court derived a SGEI mission from the 
legal context, general obligations and policy measures. However the 
exemption from notification (also enabling disbursement) should provide a 
strong incentive toward formal entrustment, which is also an effective means 
of enabling the proportionality test that is key to any EU law examination of 
the scope of a SGEI. Not explicitly defining the SG EI mission and not 
notifying state aid granted to healthcare operators that are supposed to carry 
out this implicit mission amounts to an enormous risk. First, the validity of the 
financial measures is placed into the hands of a small group of unelected 
Commission officials and EU judges. Second, it depends entirely on their 
willingness to play hide and seek and uncover “hidden” SG EI missions 
whether the workings the healthcare system at stake are jeopardised.
Universal service
It is apparent from the case law that the scope of a SGEI is predominantly 
that of the universal service which it covers along with any ancillary restrains 
that may be necessary to ensure the universal services is carried out in 
sustainable economic circumstances.117
The Ferring and Glöckner cases are illustrative of this.
. The Ferring Case (2001) concerned the issue whether state aid was 
involved in a tax on direct sales of medicines that was imposed in 
France upon pharmaceutical laboratories but not on wholesale 
distributors which corresponded to costs which the latter incurred as a 
result of public service obligations.118 According to the Court this could 
be seen as compensation and not as a selective advantage, so the 
measure involved did not constitute a state aid.119 However insofar as 
the tax advantage concerned exceeded the costs of the relevant 
public service obligation it was not covered by the SG EI exception in 
Article 106(2) TFEU as it failed to meet the requirement of necessity.
economic interest by the Member States.” Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 
on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public 
service compensation, above note 97, para 16.
117 Case C-320/91, Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533 paras 16
and 17. Cf. Case C-475/99, Glöckner, above note 13, para 57, and the discussion 
below.
118 Case C-53/00, Ferring, above note 96.
119 In this context it was relevant that Council Directive 92/25/EEC of 31 March 1992 on the
wholesale distribution of medicinal products for human use, OJ 1992, L113/1 left open 
the possibility that the Member States could impose public service obligations.
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. We have already looked at the Glockner Case (2001) above when
1 ondiscussing the concept of undertaking.120 In relation to the scope of 
Article 106(2) TFEU this Case is noteworthy because the Court held 
that fulfilling a SGEI under economically acceptable conditions 
presupposes the possibility of compensation between profitable 
(patient transport services) and less profitable (emergency transport 
services) segments, i.e. a cross-subsidy -  and consequently 
legitimises a limitation of competition in the profitable segment. 
Extending the SGEI to the profitable segment is only allowed for 
services that are closely related and provided that the undertaking
benefiting from a dominant position as a result of the SGEI is capable
121of meeting demand.
The more recent BUPA case (likewise discussed above) added several 
important qualifications with respect to SGEI and universal services.
. As was mentioned the BUPA Case arrest (2008) involved voluntary 
private supplementary health insurance in Ireland.122 The General 
Court held that in order to qualify as a SGEI the service involved need 
not be a universal service in the strict sense of meeting a demand for 
the entire population or throughout the national territory. It is 
acceptable that the services concerned have only a limited territorial or 
material scope and benefit only a relatively limited group of users. 
Even the fact that some potential users may not have the necessary 
means to enjoy the service does not affect its universal nature, insofar 
as the service in question is offered at uniform and non-discriminatory
1O^rates and on similar quality conditions for all customers.
Hence the scope of universal service is sufficiently broad in nature to cover a 
range of different national interpretations. We now move on to a brief 
discussion of the question to clarify further why SGEI may be particularly 
useful in healthcare.
Market failure and SGEI in healthcare
Healthcare markets are characterised by several types of market failure that 
may justify intervention by means of SGEI:
. Adverse selection: this occurs when insurers seek to avoid customers 
with larger health risks and compete on the relative health of their 
insured population instead of on proving better quality services.
Case C-475/99, Glöckner, above note 13.
121 Cf. Case C-41/90, Höfner, above note 10.
122 Case T-289/03, BUPA, above note 101.
123 Ibid., paras 202-203.
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. Information asymmetry: occurs because providers of healthcare have 
superior information about the nature and quality of treatment as well 
as on the need for it than do insurers or patients. At the same time 
consumers (who often do not pay for their care directly) have better 
information about their own behaviour than do insurers (who do). This 
leads to:
-  Producer moral hazard: where producers produce either more (e.g. 
due to supply induced demand) or less than is efficient and/or socially 
desirable, or produce the wrong type of care, and/or of too low quality 
and at prices that are to high;
-  Consumer moral hazard: this is especially acute whether the third 
party pays principle leads to overconsumption of care.
As we have seen in some Member States the adverse selection problem is 
addressed by means of insurance based on open enrolment, lifetime cover 
and community rating as well as defined benefits backed up by risk 
equalisation schemes, which the EU Commission has recognised as 
constituting SGEI.124 (In addition a duty of care on insurers and collecting and 
exchanging data on quality of treatment would tend to be required.) What we 
observe here is the pursuit of public policy objectives (affordable “universal” 
health insurance) by mobilising undertakings, as well as a means of opening 
up (the remainder of) markets to competition by allowing certain proportional 
restrictions.
Asymmetric information, moral hazard and principal-agent problems also 
cause problems in other healthcare markets. Most of these problems can be 
addressed in market-based manner, e.g. by insurers pooling the interests of 
consumers in their interaction with healthcare providers and acquiring the 
necessary expertise. New entrants may introduce quality based competition 
and intermediaries may start providing comparable information on quality and 
performance of healthcare providers. However, it may well be that where 
public authorities are likely to look for undertakings to solve such problems, 
they may wish to use SGEI. Emergency care, highly specialised care, 
academic care, care of multiple-handicapped persons, rare and highly 
expensive pharmaceuticals and immunization may be examples. In addition, 
where such solutions already exist, expressly classifying them as SGEI by
124
Decision of the Commission of 3 May 2005 with regard to state aid N 541/2004 en N 
542/2004 -  The Netherlands -  risk equalisation system and retention of reserves; 
Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2003 with regard to state aid N 46/2003 -  
Ireland -  risk equalisation scheme in the Irish health Insurance market; Case T-289/03, 
BUPA, above note 101.
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means of an act of entrustment, as well as ensuring proportional 
compensation, would be highly expedient from a state aid perspective.
However, is the concept of SGEI as it is so far developed in the case law of 
the ECJ capable of addressing the market failures that are common in 
healthcare? It should be noted that the ECJ has developed the test of the 
economically acceptable circumstances in order to assess whether the
A Q C
restrictions caused by a SGEI mission is proportionate. It has 
acknowledged that the provision of SGEI may be put under pressure, if 
commercially oriented enterprises were to apply themselves only to the most 
profitable activities, such as providing services in densely populated areas. 
This would leave the undertaking to which the SGEI mission is attributed with 
the less attractive activities and may prevent it from financing the universal 
provision. Hence the test of the economically acceptable circumstance is well
1ORsuited to tackling problems of cherry picking.
However, as we pointed out, in healthcare other market failures such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard are in fact more common than cherry 
picking. With the cases on risk equalisation (which could also be described 
as barring cherry picking) the Commission and the General Court have made 
a start on addressing these issues. So far ECJ case law on these counts is 
lacking. Hence, although the picture is better than in antitrust EU law does 
not provide sufficient guidance as to how the concept of SGEI should be 
applied in healthcare.
Other competition issues in healthcare
Moreover it should be noted that not all difficulties presented by the 
application of the EU competition rules to healthcare could be construed in 
terms of problems related to the provision of SGEI -  not least since the 
implication of using SGEI is that the services that are not covered are open to 
competition, and hence subject to the competition rules. We have already 
mentioned the problems concerning the geographical market definition and 
the three-sided interaction between consumers, providers of care and (public 
or private) third party payers (such as insurers). Access, affordability and 
quality are often referred to as key general healthcare concerns. More 
specific issues are how to treat integrated care, which often combines 
horizontal and vertical integration to provide managed care of usually chronic 
ailments. Likewise complex is the role of gatekeepers, such as general 
practitioners with the power of referral to a hospital or specialist, or medical
125
See e.g. paragraph 16 of case C-320/90, Corbeau, above note 117.
126 See J.W. van de Gronden, “The internal market, the state and private Initiative. A legal
assessment of national mixed public-private arrangements in the light of European law. 
Private initiative, general interest and EC law”, (2006) Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 125.
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specialists referring complex cases to top-clinical care, or ambulance 
coordination systems which have to decide which emergency ward casualties 
are taken to.
To put it differently, not all healthcare services are suitable to constitute 
SGEI. At the same time there may still be a public interest in not exposing 
them to the full force of the competition rules. In this respect, the “legitimate 
interest” approach developed in Wouters and Meca-Medina could be useful: 
after all, this approach starts from the context of a particular agreement and 
bases its assessment on the function of this agreement in the light of the 
peculiarities of the sector concerned. Consequently, this approach could well 
complement the concept of SGEI which is often (but not exclusively, e.g. in 
the state aid context) used to address dominance issues. However, as 
already stated above, the ECJ has not made clear if healthcare would be 
covered by these “legitimate interest” cases. Until that time NCAs and 
national courts are on their own when they apply competition law to 
healthcare cases.
6. Conclusion
Above, we have presented an overview of EU competition law (here defined 
to include state aid and SGEI) in the healthcare sector. Our main question 
was whether the EU presently provides sufficient guidance on the application 
of its competition rules to healthcare for national authorities, in particular 
NCAs and national courts, but also for market parties.
We have drawn the following conclusions.
The Commission and the European Courts apply the concept of undertaking 
in a functional and expansive manner. Since Pavlov and Glöckner this means 
that most providers of healthcare are likely to be caught by the competition 
rules because they provide (economic) services (potentially) in competition. 
However, whether this also applies to healthcare insurers and to public law 
bodies managing healthcare is much less clear. So far the AOK and FENIN 
cases suggest these entities are not covered if they manage a scheme that is 
predominately based on solidarity. But the precise lines of demarcation are 
not easy to draw, and these cases remain difficult to square with some of the 
other case law.
The combination of this expansive interpretation of the concept of 
undertaking in EU law, and the decentralisation of the application of EU 
competition policy are likely to force many NCAs to apply EU competition law 
to healthcare cases. National Courts will also be confronted more frequently 
with questions involving EU competition law and undertakings must make 
self-assessments whether the legal exemption from the cartel prohibition of
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Article 101(3) TFEU applies. Unfortunately however, so far there is scant 
guidance from the EU level when it comes to concrete issues of antitrust and 
merger control. This is most likely because with partial exception of 
pharmaceuticals the healthcare sector in the EU (both insurance and 
provision) remains composed of tightly regulated national enclaves with 
limited cross-border activity. Hence the Commission has only had to come 
into action on few occasions -  and has few incentives to do so, given the 
political sensitivity of the sector.
The NCAs and national courts however may be less able to avoid ruling in 
healthcare cases that are at the margin of being EU relevant (requiring an 
appreciable effects on competition and on trade). This means that a fair 
chance exists that they will come up with their own interpretations and 
approaches, and, as a result, will create a ‘Euro-national’ competition law for 
healthcare that may well be fragmented across the different Member States. 
Consequently, the application of European competition law may give rise to a 
new model of competition law: Euro-national competition rules for healthcare. 
This model combines top-down and bottom-up features, as NCAs graft a 
second layer on the first layer that is of European origin. This development 
fits in with the view of European law as a multi-layered legal order. It could 
even be argued that it respects national competences and is in line with 
principle of subsidiarity as laid down in Article 5(3) EU Treaty.
However, we are convinced that the EU and its Member States should not be 
satisfied with the current way competition law is shaping healthcare.
. First, the application of the Euro-national competition rules for 
healthcare is vulnerable to unexpected changes in law. As the AOK 
case law had made clear, as soon as the ECJ comes up with a 
decision that deviates from long-standing national practices, national 
competition authorities must immediately change their policy. This is 
damaging to the reputation of a NCA and bad for legal certainty.
. Second, NCAs are likely to will develop diverging sets of Euro-national 
competition rules for healthcare. What is permissible in one Member 
State may be forbidden in another. Such a development would 
obviously interfere with the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. Hence, the progress made in free movement law 
could (partly) be countered by divergence in EU competition law.
This risk is less pronounced in state aid, where the Commission (with a minor 
degree of decentralisation to national courts) remains directly in charge of a 
centralised system. In addition, for state aid cases, at least since the Altmark 
Case (2003) and the Altmark package (2005) the solution to balancing
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national public service objectives and the Community interest is now 
generally struck by invoking SGEI. In fact the Altmark package even contains 
a block exemption from the state aid rules for hospital services -  provided 
they are entrusted with a SGEI and there is no overcompensation. Moreover 
since BUPA the scope for universal service covers all compulsory public 
interest provision. In state aid there is. as a result, the start of healthcare- 
sensitive rulemaking and guidance by the EU Courts and Commission which 
recognises there is a solution to the proportionate pursuit of public policy 
objectives by means of universal service obligations to be found in the SGEI 
exception.
Will perhaps in future the same approach become relevant to antitrust and 
merger control? We think this would oblige Member States to take the 
entrustment requirement seriously and to define SGEI strictly, rather than 
gambling on ad hoc reasoning and a pliant approach by the Commission or 
the Union Courts deriving the public service obligations contextually. This 
strict application is also necessary to enable the key judicial check on 
proportionality. Given the large differences in the manner in which the 
healthcare sector is organised in the EU, uneven developments may be 
expected to occur in the various Member States in any event. But this should 
not deter them from emulating best practice and striving for legal certainty -  
also to the benefit of those (be it at the public or the private side of the 
market) who wish to invest in the sector and seek to promote greater choice 
and efficiency to the ultimate benefit of consumers.
Given the current division of powers between the EU and its Member States
-  the organisation and delivery of healthcare is for the Member States, 
whereas EU law provides for the rules of the market such as the competition 
rules -  it is no surprise that the EU Courts and the Commission have 
construed healthcare as a market value. As we have shown above the 
European Institutions have only just started developing healthcare-specific 
competition law: the gate to competition law has been opened by a broad 
interpretation of the concept of undertaking but there is scant specific 
guidance on the application of the prohibitions. At the same time such 
guidance would be important not just for healthcare but for the other pillars of 
the welfare state as well (such as education, social services and pensions) 
that are similarly likely to be more affected by the internal market and the 
competition rules in the near future.
Summing up, we are not arguing that the European legislature should now 
produce hard law harmonisation measures covering the application of EU 
competition law to healthcare even if such a development were conceivable. 
However, we believe it is inevitable that the EU level should take charge of 
shaping the Euro-national competition rules for healthcare and the
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development of multi-layer model in competition and healthcare. Hence, the 
Commission should develop a coherent approach towards competition law 
and healthcare, in close co-operation with the NCAs. The framework of the 
ECN seems to be a suitable arena for such discussions, which could 
culminate in soft law documents such as guidelines and communications. 
Key points to be addressed in these documents are related to the role of 
SGEI and of the “legitimate objectives” case law in Wouters and Meca- 
Medina in healthcare. Other issues relate to the market failures (adverse 
selection, information asymmetry and moral hazard) discussed above, as 
well as quality, the role of gatekeepers and vertical integration.
On the one hand, given cross-border services, investment and establishment 
healthcare is an emerging market which throughout the EU is inexorably 
exposed to market forces. On the other hand, given parallel developments of 
increased longevity, rising expectations and constant innovation, healthcare 
is at the heart of modern society. Hence EU competition law will have to 
show that it is equal to the challenge of offering this key sector a competition 
law framework that is based on a coherent approach and strikes an adequate 
balance between competition concerns and healthcare objectives.
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